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Appalling fascination
The Emerging Anthropology of « the Political » in Postcolonial South
Asia*
Une fascination effarée : l’émergence d’une anthropologie du « politique » dans
l’Asie du sud postcoloniale
Jonathan Spencer
 
Introduction
1 In 1984 the Tamil movie-star and politician, M.G. Ramachandram, was paralysed by a
stroke. For three years he lived on in a Brooklyn hospital room, his followers celebrating
the miracle of the « thrice‑born» leader’s survival. Finally in 1987 the end came. M.S.S.
Pandian uses what followed to introduce his short monograph on MGR:
Perhaps  the  best  way  to  begin  the  incomparable  success  story  of  Marudur
Gopalamenon  Ramachandram  (popularly  known  as  MGR)  and  hid  politics,  is  to
begin with his funeral… No less than two million people, including several who had
travelled long distances from remote villages, formed MGR’s rather long funeral
procession.  In  other  places,  people  who  could  not  attend  the  actual  funeral
organized mock « funerals » in which images of MGR were taken out in procession
and buried with full  ritual.  Countless young men tonsured their heads,  a Hindu
ritual  usually  performed  when  someone  of  the  family  dies.  Thirty‑one  of  his
desolate followers, unable to contain their grief, committed suicide. (Pandian, 1992:
17).
2 Two million mourners,  thirty‑one suicides:  MGR’s  life  has  been mapped out  in  such
apparently surreal statistics: in 1967, when a fellow actor shot him, 50,000 fans gathered
at the hospital where he was treated. When he suffered his stroke in 1984, « At least
twenty‑two  people  immolated  themselves,  or  cut  off  their  limbs,  fingers  or  toes  as
offerings to various deities, praying for the ailing leader’s life ». During this last illness,
27,000 new roadside shrines were constructed in Tamil Nadu (Pandian, 1992: 18).
3 The roads in the North‑Eastern state of Bihar have also been witness to some interesting
political phenomena, notably the arrest of the BJP leader A.K. Advani on his theatrical
Appalling fascination
Journal des anthropologues, 92-93 | 2003
1
progression towards the Babri Masjid mosque in Ayodhya in 1990. The Chief Minister for
Bihar at the time was Laloo Prasad Yadav. Since 1997, Prasad has been jailed at least five
times in the judicial  fall‑out  from his  larger‑than‑life  administration of  the state.  In
November 2001 he was ordered to surrender to the court in Ranchi. Here, from the Indian
magazine Frontline, is an account of Laloo’s trip to court:
Laloo  Prasad  arrived  in  Ranchi  with  fanfare,  travelling  on  a  motorized  chariot
which he called Sadbhavna rath. The journey was more than anything a political
show.  The  RJD  supremo’s  entourage  consisted  of  hundreds  of  horses,  camels,
elephants and a music band. Supporters presented him with a sword as he travelled
in his  air-conditioned rath,  which was  escorted by a  kilometres-long cavalcade.
Party  workers  chanted  slogans  such  as:  « (Don’t  worry  Laloo  Yadav,  the  entire
people  are  behind you) ».  Laloo Prasad stopped en route  at  Biharsgarif  to  offer
chaddar (a length of holy cloth) at the tomb of the Sufi saint Makhdom Baba. The
cavalcade virtually laid siege to the highway leading to Ranchi1.
4 Horses, camels, elephants: I guess we’re not in Kansas any more. Laloo’s career has been
built upon his position as a member of a numerically powerful group, the Yadavs, who
have been active within the politicization of the so-called Backward Classes since the
1970s. When the LSE anthropologist Lucia Michelutti carried out fieldwork with Yadavs in
Uttar Pradesh a few years ago, she was told that they were a « martial race », and « by
caste "natural" politicians » (Michelutti, 2001: 1).
Informants  explain  their  predisposition  to  succeed  in  the  political  game  as
« innate ». They said that « they learn it in the womb/belly » (pet se sikhte hai) and
that they were born to be politicians. Informants use the same « belly » metaphor
when  they  answer  my  queries  about  apprenticeship  especially  in  relation  to
activities related to the cow-herding profession2 (Michelutti, 2001: 2).
5 Yadavs are good, they say, at « doing politics ». 
6 Not everyone, though, is quite so happy with this version of the dharma of the politician.
In West Bengal, another LSE anthropologist, Arild Ruud encountered a rather different
valuation of the political.  In the opening months of his fieldwork, people persistently
berated him on the topic of « politics »:
One term that was often used is « dirty » (nungra). Politics was referred to as being
dirty, meaning unprincipled, as something unsavoury that morally upright people
would not touch, a sullied game of bargaining and dishonesty. Another term that
was frequently employed to describe this foul game was « disturbance » (gandagol).
Politics,  it  was  held,  represented  a  continuous  social  disturbance  that  caused
unease, brought disharmony to society, and ruined its elaborate design and calm
stability. The reason for this, I was told, was that politics thrived on instances of
trouble,  or  « rows »  (jhamela).  These  could  be  outright  fist‑fights  (maramari),  or
abusive exchanges (galagali), drawn-out quarrels (jhagra), or just general animosity
and hostility (hingsa). (Ruud, 2001: 116).
7 In the paper from which this is taken, Ruud goes on to explore the local construction of
politics as dirty work, within the framework of what he calls the « Indianization » of
political institutions. Although he spends some time trying to work out why so many
people turned up for an apparently pointless and rather dull village political meeting,
Ruud doesn’t  comment on the very frequency with which people told him about the
unsavouriness of local politics, the apparent enthusiasm with which they reported on the
moral  failings of  political  leaders.  Reading between the lines,  my sense is  that  these
Bengali  villagers,  like  people  across  the  subcontinent,  were  at  once  appalled  and
fascinated by the workings of the political. What grips them at one level is the sheer
melodrama of it  all,  the ostentatiously performed agonism of the exchanges between
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political  opponents,  as  well  as  the  symbolic  excess  of  South  Asia’s  magical  realist
politicians – elephants and camels on the road to jail.
 
Sri Lanka and the limits of our theoretical vocabulary
8 All the examples so far have illuminated one or other facet of what we might understand
as « the political » in contemporary South Asia.  The political  encompasses the village
meeting, the nasty local gossip about the backstage deals of local leaders, but also the
spectacular excesses of a Laloo or an MGR. In Sri Lanka in the early 1980s I encountered
all of this. In purely entertainment terms, political rallies were the biggest shows in town,
with speeches and singers and the helicopter touching down with the biggest of the big
cheeses to attend. In the village where I conducted my fieldwork, people spoke of politics
(desapalanaya) in terms very like Ruud’s Bengali informants: as a dirty business, a source
of trouble and moral disturbance. But the political, so construed, also stood as the ground
against  which  other,  more  positive,  images  crystallized:  the  political  rally  was  the
quintessential setting for the enunciation of nationalist rhetoric, for speeches about the
Sinhala people and their destiny as Guardian of the island of Lanka and protector of the
heritage of the Buddha. As well as the pop singers and polticoes, there would always be a
body of Buddhist monks on the platform at local rallies, lending the occasion a minimal
sense of gravitas. The agonistic world of politics contained, within it, expressions of its
own negation:  the transcendence of  division and interest  signified,  in their  different
ways, in the symbolism of the nation and the presence of the body (sangha) of Buddhist
monks.
9 There was something electric about local politics in the early 1980s, a sense of excitement
and unpredictability. Partly this was a result of the way in which national politics had
become braided into the very fabric of local sociality: neighbours pursued neighbour-type
disputes  about  chickens  and  buffaloes  in  the  idiom of  party  political  divisions.  The
politically connected prospered, the politically disconnected were persecuted. Eager lads
attached themselves to minor local leaders, basking in their own ephemeral importance
in the leader’s retinue, and ever ready to throw their weight around when so required.
Everyone discussed the doings of national politi cians in first-name terms.
10 But electricity contains its dangers too. Violence was a real threat in local politics and,
after  I  left,  the  capillaries  of  neighbourhood political  divisions  became the  channels
through which denunciations and counter-denunciations flowed as the island was swept
by a wave of political terror. A radical group called the JVP targetted local agents of the
ruling  party;  the  powers-that-be  in  their  retaliations  sometimes  identified  whole
categories, young men from particular castes or villages, and sometimes just picked on
old  enemies  with  much  more  particular  scores  to  settle.  The  violence  shocked  and
horrified my own closest informants when I spoke to them a few years later: this was not
like our country, they told me, everything was turned upside down. And, as one told me,
« We don’t do politics any more ».
11 What to do? (as they say in Sri Lanka). It was the early 1980s, and there I was, an Anglo-
Saxon empiricist committed to writing about what was there, and not what I would have
liked to be there. Nothing had prepared me for my hosts’ obsession with the political, and
intellectually little came along during the 1980s in my lonely hunt for an appropriate
intellectual toolkit.
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12 The most obvious place to start looking for theoretical sustenance was in that thing called
« political anthropology ». Somehow, though, that didn’t seem equal to the task. The most
obviously  « political »  thread  of  the  next  decade,  the  anthropology  of  power  and
resistance, also struck me as unhelpful. Two more useful developments came in the shape
of the emerging anthropologies of nationalism and violence, so like those around me, my
Sri Lanka was most theoretically thought through in terms of violence and the nation. It’s
taken a lot longer to begin to come to terms with the political, and it may be helpful to
reflect briefly on what it was about the political that proved so uncongenial to the more
obvious possible theoretical tools.  As we assess what was wrong with the intellectual
material to hand, so the nature of the problem, and the outlines of possible resolutions,
may begin to swim into better focus.
13 Problems of time and space rule out any kind of nuanced account, but let me start with
the most obvious suspect:  political  anthropology.  What was so wrong with what was
called political anthropology in the late 1970s? A casual answer might simply be that it
was boring, a subdiscipline that had run out of steam at some point in the early 1970s.
Behind that rather jaundiced assessment lies one partial truth: that what made political
anthropology less and less interesting was its propensity to strip away whatever was
distinctive and interesting about any particular bit of politics in the first place, and that in
turn was a consequence of the very way in which it had been defined: « A comparative
study of  political  systems has to be on an abstract plane where social  processes  are
stripped of their cultural  idiom and are reduced to functional terms »,  as Fortes and
Evans-Pritchard (1940: 3) famously put it. No camels and elephants for them. The price of
reducing something,  as we all  know, is  reductionism, and that particular spectre has
haunted political anthropology ever after.
14 Quite apart from its hostility to particular « cultural idioms », political anthropology also
evaded the moral dimension of the political.
I  assume that individuals faced with a choice of  action will  commonly use such
choice so as to gain power, that is to say they will seek recognition as social persons
who have power; or, to use a different language, they will seek to gain access to
office or the esteem of their fellows which may lead them to office. (Leach, 1954:
10). 
15 Edmund Leach’s heuristic has a long provenance in Western social thought. One lineage
leads back to Machiavelli’s espousal of a cold-eyed realism in assessing human affairs: « I
shall  set  aside  fantasies  about  rulers,  then,  and  consider  what  happens  in  fact »
(Machiavelli, 1988: 54). The other derives from that moment in the eighteenth century,
magisterially  analysed  by  Albert  Hirschman  (1977),  when  social  thinkers  started  to
separate the passions from the interests, allowing their successors to posit a rational,
calculating individual as the ontological basis,  the axis of certainty,  for the emerging
human sciences. Which, needless to say, doesn’t stop Leach’s formula sounding quite a bit
like the view from Bengal or Sri Lanka, where politics is indeed often seen as the zone of
untrammelled individual interest. But there is a difference in tone: Leach, unlike Ruud’s
peasants, sees nothing corrupting or « dirty », there is no « disturbance », in his view of
human action. Rather, « a conscious or unconscious wish to gain power is a very general
motive  in  human affairs »  (Leach,  1954:  10).  Leach’s  urbane  generalization  somehow
strips this kind of action of its power to disturb us. To seek power in some sense or other
is an unremarkable course of action, true enough; but to seek power and nothing else,
nakedly, in public, strikes many people as strange and rather disturbing. The effect of
Leach’s heuristic, and the tradition of thought he is speaking from, is to naturalize such
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conduct, to deprive it of its sense of moral danger and make it, instead, something banal
and commonplace. Hirschman’s marvellous essay is partly concerned to remind us of the
tortuous path that eventually allowed social philosophers to claim a direct causal link
between  the  pursuit  of  the  personal  interest  and  the  moral  improvement  of  the
collectivity.  The point is  simple:  such a link is far from self‑evident,  and the Bengali
village reaction is a recurrent feature of people’s encounter with the agonistic space of
the political.
16 As political anthropology became routinized in the 1950s and 1960s it did so in the long
and gloomy shadow cast by its big sister, political science. Looking back at the literature
of that time, two aspects stand out. One, obviously enough, is the confident deployment
of the cool language of dispassionate science: « Ways of viewing the differences between
political and other kinds of social relationships are neither right nor wrong but merely
more or less useful for scientific purposes », as the political scientist David Easton (1959:
219)  put  it  in  a  once-influential  survey  of  political  anthropology.  Classic  political
anthropology was greatly concerned with definitions of its subject matter, formal models,
and typologies. These may have had their use in marking out a certain territory for the
new subdiscipline, but they also had one other effect: to pin down, and thus somehow
contain the political. If the empirical problem we are trying to analyse is in part the very
uncontainability of the political, its tendency to overflow its banks and wash through all
areas of social life, this stance is, to put it no stronger, unhelpful.
17 Whatever the reasons, political anthropology was in something of a rut by the mid 1970s
and is only now beginning to re-emerge from that rut, albeit in the fastidiously rephrased
guise  of  the  new « anthropology  of  politics ».  The  dominant  exploration  of  political
themes in anthropology in the intervening years came in the form of the anthropology of
power and resistance.  In the late 1980s I  took my tales of village politics and village
nationalism on tour through some of the better-known and more theoretically advanced
sites of North American anthropology. The results were not an overwhelming success.
« Where are the bodies? » I was asked; « Where is the resistance? » My answers failed to
impress.
18 Although the work carried out within this broad paradigm had its own distinctive air of
righteous  struggle,  it’s  worth remembering how much of  its  intellectual  roots  lie  in
moments  of  political  defeat.  British  cultural  Marxists  like  Raymond  Williams  and
E.P. Thompson  wrote  their  most  influential  work  in  the  shadows  cast  by  the  Soviet
invasion of Hungary, and later by the political disappointments of Wilson’s 1960s Labour
government.  Their  successors  at  the  Birmingham  Centre  for  Cultural  Studies  were
intellectual refugees from the early years of Thatcherism. In India, the Subaltern Studies
project was born out of the ashes of the early 1970s Naxalite agitations, and the bitter
political disillusion of Indira Gandhi’s Emergency. In all these cases, the pursuit of politics
and political struggle in other places not normally thought of as political – in domesticity,
styles of dress, religious and other idioms – was a kind of redemptive act, a gesture of
hope in an otherwise bleak political landscape. The price, though, was either indifference,
or even hostility, to what people themselves might take to be the political.
19 A good empirical example of this can be found in Scott’s Weapons of the Weak (1985). As
well as sabotaging the farm machinery, and swapping counter-hegemonic gossip about
their local oppressors, people in Sedaka do quite a bit of politics. Scott is too honest an
ethnographer  not  to  record  this,  but  the  facts  of  local  politics  are  left  outside  his
dominant narrative, and dealt with in a voice of mild puzzlement. Why do a minority of
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villagers,  some rich but mostly poor,  align themselves with the opposition PAS when
there is no possible material advantage in so doing? In running through the reasons,
Scott ends up with the half-hearted categories « moral appeal » and « sheer pride and
stubbornness » (1985: 134‑5). 
20 A more concerted attempt to theorize the issue can be found in the early programmatic
statements  of  the  Subaltern  collective.  Ranajit  Guha’s  « On  some  aspects  of  the
historiography of colonial India » (Guha, 1982) complains about « the narrow and partial
view of politics » in existing historiography, a view in which « the parameters of Indian
politics  are  assumed  to  be  or  enunciated  as  exclusively  or  primarily  those  of  the
institutions  introduced  by  the  British  for  the  government  of  the  country  and  the
corresponding sets of laws, policies, attitudes and other elements of the superstructure ».
His target here is those historians of the 1960s and early 1970s whose concern with the
formal minutiae of factions and alliances among colonial elites parallels the similar work
done by political anthropologists at that time. In contrast to this narrow identification of
politics with the workings of  the colonial  state,  Guha delineates what he calls  the « 
autonomous domain » of « the politics of the people » (Guha, 1982: 3‑4; original emphasis).
And, in a later essay, he talks about the state as « an absolute externality… structured like a
despotism, with no mediating depths, no space provided for a transaction between the will
of the rulers and that of the ruled » (Guha, 1989: 274). In other words, Guha is insisting on
a  radical  break  between  state  and  society,  with  the  state  only  ever  imaginable  as
something emanating from outside the local social order. And, lest we think this only
refers to the colonial state, he closes this later essay with an allusion to « the character of
the successor regime too as a dominance without hegemony » (Guha, 1989: 307).
21 Here then, we may find, in an unusually clear and theorized form, an explanation for the
most obvious lacuna in the literature of resistance: the world of organized politics, with
its elections, spectacles, feats of outlandish representation, outbreaks of violence, and
endless capacity for moral  alarm. All  of  this is,  as it  were,  outside the frame.  In the
literature on resistance, the state is never a resource, or a place to seek justice, let alone a
zone of hope, however distant or deferred, in the political imaginary. It is, if it appears at
all, an « absolute externality », an alien source of coercion, violence or fear; and thus the
only  theoretically  correct  response  to  the  state  is  resistance.  I  am,  of  course,
extemporizing into territory not covered in Guha’s article, but a sense of the state as
« absolute externality » is precisely what we find, again and again, in the anthropological
literature on resistance.
22 This  grouchy  excursus  into  recent  history  has  clarified  three  issues  to  do  with  the
political. One is that it is hard to map the political onto the Manichaean struggle between
power and resistance. The second is that understanding the political, not surprisingly,
requires a parallel understanding of the state. The third, which links the first two, is that,
in the space of the political, the state is not necessarily seen as distant and alien, but
rather there is always the enticing possibility, however much deferred, of making the
state « our state ». That, of course, is the promise of democracy.
 
Resources for an anthropology of the political
23 Let me recapitulate the argument so far. The point of this paper is to argue the case for a
new approach to the anthropology of the political,  an approach that would do better
justice to the complexity of the examples I cited in my introduction: two larger than life
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political  leaders,  MGR and Laloo;  the emergence of  a self‑conscious category of  « the
political »  covering  specific  actors,  settings,  performances,  and  collectivities;  and  an
ambivalent attitude, part horror, part fascination, towards this emergent category. In this
final  section I  want  to  review some of  the intellectual  resources  which may help to
illuminate the issue. First, though, I want to return to the early history of the political in
Sri Lanka in order to tease out two central issues: the political as productive, and the
centrality of the agonistic.
24 Some  years  ago  the  political  analyst  Mick  Moore  (1985)  suggested  the  most  useful
periodization for Sri Lankan political history would pivot around 1931 (rather than, say,
Independence or any of the subsequent major regime changes), which would have the
interesting  consequence  of  making  the  modern  history  of  Sri  Lanka  an  essentially
democratic history3. The crucial transition was not the formal transfer of power in 1948,
or the shift from a patrician to a populist mode of politics in 1956. 1931 was the year in
which universal adult suffrage was introduced, despite the reservations of Sri Lanka’s
leading  nationalist  politicians  (who  thought  their  people  « unready »  for  political
participation).  Almost  immediately  elite  politicians  started  to  mobilize  voters  on
« ethnic » lines, such that political relations between the Sinhala majority and the Tamil
minority started to polarize even before the first votes had been cast in the new mass
politics (Russell, 1982). Consider the electoral history of my fieldwork area in the 1930s.
The first  representative was a member of  the best‑known local  elite family,  and was
elected unopposed in 1931. When he retired on health grounds in 1933, his family threw
their weight behind a well‑known local Tamil figure, who was narrowly defeated by a
Colombo-based candidate. His local backers suffered the further humiliation of having a
bag of lentils – the quintessential Tamil food – left on their verandah. And so it went on
through the 1930s, as more and more elite families became embroiled in the ever more
bitter local  political  fighting,  different factions putting forward their candidates,  and
different  parties  aligning  on  either  side  (Jiggins,  1979:  96‑111).  Reading  about  these
events during my field research, I used to wonder how this all must have appeared to
those not directly involved. Although, the same elite families had squabbled endlessly and
pursued each other through the colonial courts, they were still used to a high degree of
everyday deference. The pantomime of abuse and counter‑abuse which came with these
early elections must have made the deference harder and harder to sustain. By 1981 local
supporters of the governing party had satirically named their dogs Banda, an honorific
previously reserved for the high aristocratic subcastes which, in this area at least, had
aligned themselves with their political opponents.
25 Writing in the late 1980s, this is how I described the contours of political engagement:
Political  alignments… are embedded in the particularities of  local  disagreement,
and these is thus a high degree of contingency in party political affiliation in any
particular locality. Politics. like petitions and court cases in the past, has become a
medium through which villagers can act out all sorts of ostensibly « non-political »
disagreements. All manner of rifts and disputes may become expressed as political
differences; class could, in some cases, certainly be a factor, but so too could caste,
religious  community,  family  disagreements,  minor  economic  rivalries,  and  bad
blood of all kinds. (Spencer, 1990: 226).
26 What was fundamental to the political, as I explored it, was the fact of agonism, what Carl
Schmitt called « the friend‑enemy antithesis ». The particular social lineaments of this or
that particular manifestation of  this were,  I  felt,  of  less significance than the fact  of
agonism itself4.  Schmitt’s  anti‑liberal  apprehension of  the political  has  been recently
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taken  up  by  Chantal  Mouffe,  not  least  for  its  acerbic  value  in  confronting  the
« consensual » banalities of the Blair‑Giddens « Third Way ». Mouffe (2000), (in a set of
essays which I  found thoroughly and engagingly Sri  Lankan),  rehearses  a  critique of
recent liberal theories of democracy. Deliberative theories of democracy, like those of
Rawls and Habermas, seek to ground themselves in the possibility of consensus, however
hypothetical or deferred that consensus may be. In contrast, she emphasizes the agonistic
core  of  democracy,  the  need  for  adversarial  positions,  and  the  ways  in  which  the
workings  of  power  constitute the  very  identities  around  which  political  competition
works. 
27 These, I would suggest, are the paradoxes and creative tensions which the villagers were
trying to make sense of in their apprehension of the working of local politics. The rich
and self-conscious local understanding of « politics » as a temporary collective malaise
represents  an attempt to bound off,  and thus make safe,  the disturbing workings of
something like Mouffe’s « agonistic pluralism ». The recourse to violence, especially in
the years of terror in the late 1980s, remind us how difficult this work of bounding really
is, (as well as why it such an attractive ideal). The party identities around which village
divisions  mobilized  had  no  coherent  existence  outside  the  domain  of representative
politics  (although  they  omnivorously  subsumed  other  identities  with  other
histories – caste, religion, ethnicity). The roots of ethnic enmity and the coalescence of
« Tamil » and « Sinhala » as opposed solidarities can be plausibly traced to the pattern of
electoral politics in the first decade of mass democracy (the 1930s in Sri Lanka). These are
not free-standing and self-evident divisions which somehow the political  process has
failed to « manage »: they are in many ways products of that very process. 
28 If politics merely produced antagonisms that would be interesting, but hardly news to
anyone who had followed an electoral campaign, anywhere in the world, ever (with the
exception of some of the curious staged elections under state socialism). But the
carnivalesque space of politics is a space of possibility and license: license to argue, and
license to joke, and license to experiment with challenges to the order of things. It is, for
this reason, also a space of danger, anxiety, and concern. In the 1930s the village I have
described was a place where low caste people could be beaten for walking too close to a
high caste  person,  and  where  the  local  landlords  cultivated  an  aura  of  aristocratic
detachment from the sordid lives of their tenants: they were greeted with gestures of
worship, and addressed with elaborate honorifics and a language of utmost respect. In the
very first elections, the tenants had the undoubted pleasure of watching leading members
of  those  same aristocratic  families  exchange  public  insults  of  the  coarsest  sort,  and
enduring the very public humiliation of electoral defeat. This is what Sunil Khilnani is
alluding to when he speaks of « the democratic idea » penetrating « the Indian political
imagination » and corroding « the authority of the social order and of a paternalist state »
(Khilnani, 1997: 16‑17), and it is what Lefort means by « the dissolution of the markers of
certainty » (Lefort, 1988: 19).
29 There are many other things that happen in the space of the political, including not a
little humour, fantasy and entertainment. The sheer symbolic excess of figures like Lalloo
and MGR (not to mention his successor Jayalalitha) puts the pretensions of most political
« science »  to  shame,  but  they  also  challenge  the  explanatory  power  of  post-liberal
theories of democracy too. More theoretical resources are clearly needed. Hansen (1999)
has turned to Zizek’s comic take on Lacan in his work on Hindu nationalism, as has
Navaro‑Yashin  (2002)  in  her  recent  monograph  on  Turkey.  Minimally,  this  kind  of
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analysis introduces a certain dynamism in our attempts to think through the excesses of
political representation and political discourse, and the ambivalence with which people
view,  and engage  in,  the  political.  Navaro‑Yashin,  though,  also  grounds  her  analysis
firmly in recent writing on the state, especially in thinking through the implications of
Taussig’s  celebrated  essay  on  « state  fetishism »  (Taussig  1992).  Recognition  of  the
magical, or auratic, quality of the state is, of course, nothing new. This, in different ways,
is  what  Hocart  (1936)  and  Kantorowicz  (1957)  were  delineating  in  their  writings  on
kingship.
30 So,  I  am  suggesting  that  the  emerging  anthropology  of  the  political  will  draw  its
intellectual sustenance from a number of partially independent intellectual positions.
Any analyst wanting to explore this area must work out their own congenial space in a
rough triangle, with post‑liberal theorists of democracy at one corner, psychoanalytically
inclined commentators on ideology, representation and symbol at another, and the rich
vein of anthropological work on kingship, state and ritual at the third. (And it would
never do to forget the material circumstances of those involved, so some kind of political
economy would make the triangle three-dimensional).
31 Finally, what kind of an object is a « democratic modernity »? The invocation of kingship
and the attempt to clothe the political figure in the magical dress of kingship suggest one
example. The President of Sri Lanka in the early 1980s was a part‑time magical realist
called J.R. Jayawardene. As part of his own project of political self‑making he dabbled
frequently in kingly imagery, invoking royal antecedents for his own actions, including a
rather ostentatious and frankly hilarious recreation of the royal ceremony of the first
sowing, which involved a bathetic tableau of elite politicians dressed as peasants, uneasily
wading through the  mud of  a  paddy field  (Kemper  1991).  Here  we have  at  once  an
apparent continuity with a premodern past, and in its satirical apprehension by some
spectators  at  least,  its  « modern »  antithesis.  Similarly,  Ruud’s  argument  for  the
« Indianization » of democratic political  institutions,  as they bed into the contours of
local  argument and local  concerns,  is  at  once a  powerful  argument about  continuity
across  any  facile  modern/premodern  boundary,  but  again  (if  we  think  about  the
‘corrosive’ qualities of the democratic imagination) it carries within it the constant threat
of discontinuity. Think of Laloo’s air-conditioned chariot, followed by horses, camels and
elephants. Here, in the space of ambivalence and excess, of the simultaneous necessity
and impossibility of  continuity,  we have a splendid object  for  future anthropological
enquiry.
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NOTES
*. This paper is  based on sections from my (perennially)  near-complete book,  which has the
working title An Anthorpologist among the Nationalists or Anthropology after the Political Turn.
1. See K. Chaudhuri (2001).
2. Yadavs were « traditionally » cowherd and farmers.
3. A similar point has been made more recently by David Scott (1999: 158‑89), apparently without
reference to Moore’s earlier argument.
4. « The  political  can  derive  its  energy  from  the  most  varied  human  endeavors,  from  the
religious, economic, moral, and other antitheses. It does not describe its own substance, but only
the intensity of an association or dissociation of human beings whose motives can be religious,
national (in the ethnic or cultural sense), economic, or of another kind and can effect at different
times different coalitions and separations » (Schmitt, 1996 [1932]: 38).
ABSTRACTS
This paper starts from a very specific ethnographic context – the carnivalesque world of electoral
politics  in  rural  Sri  Lanka  in  the  early  1980s –  and  moves  out  to  propose  a  new  object  for
anthropological enquiry in postcolonial South Asia. My earlier work in Sri Lanka had delineated
the ways in which a strong local understanding of « politics » (desapalanaya) and the « political »
had developed in the years since Independence. The political was the zone of agonism and abuse,
engagement and disgust, of performance and rhetoric, an area of life at once fascinating and
appalling. Similar readings of « the political » occur in recent ethnographies from other points in
the subcontinent,  suggesting at  least  a family  resemblance in  these  geographically  disparate
cultural  responses  to  the world of  mass  politics.  Drawing on recent  developments  in radical
democratic  theory  – especially  the  work  of  Chantal  Mouffe –  I  shall  attempt  a  more  formal
account  of  "the  political"  as  a  necessary,  but  necessarily  unpredictable  and  uncontainable,
expression of democratic modernity in South Asia.  Ethnographic attention to the idea of the
political as a site of unruly cultural production may, I suggest, help the ongoing renewal of the
anthropology  of  politics,  and  allow  ethnographers  to  escape  the  arid  explanatory  grids
(formalism, instrumentalism, culturalism) which so limited earlier political anthropology.
Partant d’un contexte ethnographique très spécifique – le monde carnavalesque de la politique
électorale au Sri Lanka rural au début des années 1980 – cet article élargit ensuite la portée de sa
réflexion  pour  proposer  un  nouvel  objet  d’enquête  anthropologique  dans  l’Asie  du  sud
postcoloniale. Mes travaux antérieurs au Sri Lanka avaient examiné comment s’était développée
depuis  l’indépendance  une  conscience  locale  aiguë  de  « la  politique »  (desapalanaya)  et  du
« politique ». Le politique était la zone du conflit et de l’injure, de l’attrait et du dégoût, de la
mise en scène et de la rhétorique, un domaine de la vie à la fois fascinant et effarant. On trouve
de semblables interprétations du « politique » dans des études ethnologiques récentes portant
sur d’autres parties du sous-continent, ce qui suggère l’existence d’un air de famille entre ces
réponses  culturelles,  géographiquement  disparates,  au  monde  de  la  politique  de  masse.
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M’appuyant sur les développements récents d’une théorisation « radicale » de la démocratie – et
notamment les travaux de Chantal Mouffe – je tenterai d’avancer une explication plus formelle
du  « politique »  comme  expression  nécessaire,  mais  nécessairement  imprévisible  et  non-
maîtrisable, de la modernité démocratique en Asie du sud. Porter un regard ethnographique sur
l’idée du politique comme un lieu de production culturelle désordonnée pourrait contribuer au
renouveau actuel de l’anthropologie du politique, et permettre aux anthropologues d’échapper à
des  grilles  explicatives  arides  (formalisme,  instrumentalisme,  culturalisme)  qui  avaient
auparavant constitué les limites de l’anthropologie politique.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Asie du Sud, démocratie, modernité, politique, production culturelle, Sri Lanka
Keywords: cultural production, democraty, modernity, politics, South Asia, Sri Lanka
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